I'll be back on Monday. I'll be on KTLK tomorrow morning at 9:00 CST (I think).
A new home for Counterparties
1 hour ago
Nerds of the living dead



Prices of U.S. existing homes suffered a record drop in August and the rate of sales tumbled, offering little sign of improvement in the source of the financial crisis in the United States.
The pace of existing home sales decreased 2.2 percent to an annual pace of 4.91 million units while the median national home price declined a record 9.5 percent to $203,100, the National Association of Realtors said on Wednesday.
In what would normally be a potentially bright spot, the overstock of homes for sale shrank. However, the trade group said as many as 2 in 5 home sales were by borrowers who have seen their property lose value or are facing foreclosure.
"The NAR estimates that 35-to-40 percent of all sales are of distressed property, so underlying private activity is weaker than the headlines (imply) and there is little sign of imminent improvement," Ian Shepherdson, chief U.S. economist at High Frequency Economics.
The inventory of existing homes for sale fell 7.0 percent to 4.26 million from the record-high overstock reported in July.
The annual sales pace was down 11.5 percent from July to 460,000 homes and was sharply off the 510,000 pace expected by economists. The August decline was the biggest since November 2007.
The median sales price of $221,900 was off 5.5 percent from July, the lowest since $211,600 in September 2004.
The August sales pace was the weakest since 401,000 in January 1991.
First, how did our economy reach this point?
Well, most economists agree that the problems we are witnessing today developed over a long period of time. For more than a decade, a massive amount of money flowed into the United States from investors abroad, because our country is an attractive and secure place to do business. This large influx of money to U.S. banks and financial institutions -- along with low interest rates -- made it easier for Americans to get credit. These developments allowed more families to borrow money for cars and homes and college tuition -- some for the first time. They allowed more entrepreneurs to get loans to start new businesses and create jobs.
Unfortunately, there were also some serious negative consequences, particularly in the housing market. Easy credit -- combined with the faulty assumption that home values would continue to rise -- led to excesses and bad decisions. Many mortgage lenders approved loans for borrowers without carefully examining their ability to pay. Many borrowers took out loans larger than they could afford, assuming that they could sell or refinance their homes at a higher price later on.
Optimism about housing values also led to a boom in home construction. Eventually the number of new houses exceeded the number of people willing to buy them. And with supply exceeding demand, housing prices fell. And this created a problem: Borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages who had been planning to sell or refinance their homes at a higher price were stuck with homes worth less than expected -- along with mortgage payments they could not afford. As a result, many mortgage holders began to default.
These widespread defaults had effects far beyond the housing market. See, in today's mortgage industry, home loans are often packaged together, and converted into financial products called "mortgage-backed securities." These securities were sold to investors around the world. Many investors assumed these securities were trustworthy, and asked few questions about their actual value. Two of the leading purchasers of mortgage-backed securities were Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Because these companies were chartered by Congress, many believed they were guaranteed by the federal government. This allowed them to borrow enormous sums of money, fuel the market for questionable investments, and put our financial system at risk.
The decline in the housing market set off a domino effect across our economy. When home values declined, borrowers defaulted on their mortgages, and investors holding mortgage-backed securities began to incur serious losses. Before long, these securities became so unreliable that they were not being bought or sold. Investment banks such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers found themselves saddled with large amounts of assets they could not sell. They ran out of the money needed to meet their immediate obligations. And they faced imminent collapse. Other banks found themselves in severe financial trouble. These banks began holding on to their money, and lending dried up, and the gears of the American financial system began grinding to a halt.
I'm a strong believer in free enterprise. So my natural instinct is to oppose government intervention. I believe companies that make bad decisions should be allowed to go out of business. Under normal circumstances, I would have followed this course. But these are not normal circumstances. The market is not functioning properly. There's been a widespread loss of confidence. And major sectors of America's financial system are at risk of shutting down.
The government's top economic experts warn that without immediate action by Congress, America could slip into a financial panic, and a distressing scenario would unfold:
More banks could fail, including some in your community. The stock market would drop even more, which would reduce the value of your retirement account. The value of your home could plummet. Foreclosures would rise dramatically. And if you own a business or a farm, you would find it harder and more expensive to get credit. More businesses would close their doors, and millions of Americans could lose their jobs. Even if you have good credit history, it would be more difficult for you to get the loans you need to buy a car or send your children to college. And ultimately, our country could experience a long and painful recession.
Fellow citizens: We must not let this happen. I appreciate the work of leaders from both parties in both houses of Congress to address this problem -- and to make improvements to the proposal my administration sent to them. There is a spirit of cooperation between Democrats and Republicans, and between Congress and this administration. In that spirit, I've invited Senators McCain and Obama to join congressional leaders of both parties at the White House tomorrow to help speed our discussions toward a bipartisan bill.




And so, they have finally done it. Washington has finally bet every dollar of earnings and wealth you and I and every other taxpayer has ever made in our entire lives; every dollar that will ever be made by our children's generation; and every dollar that will ever be made by our grandchildren's generation; in an attempt -- that is by no means guaranteed to succeed -- to prop up the reckless and malign neoliberal "shadow banking system" of Wall Street.
This was a crisis that wasn't just foreseeable. It wasn't just foreseen. It was shouted about from the rooftops for almost half a decade. And yet Washington refused to hear, because the shouters were the Dirty Unwashed Hippies who live outside the zone of neoliberal economic consensus that is elective Washington, D.C.
And they will not hear now, either. Awash in their elective sinecures and their corporate campaign contributions, all that remains is the Rendering of the Bill to the suckers and the chumps. That's us.
Pray tell, exactly why did Congressional leaders sit in "stunned silence" on September 18, 2008 as it was explained to them that the collective unpayable $ TRILLIONS of debt of millions of ridiculous mortgages for houses and condos bought at unsustainable values, debt that was packaged and sold and then borrowed against at rates of 30 or 40 to 1 by a shadow banking system that they and the Administration birthed and nurtured, debt that had been booked as ficitious profits by that system, debt that in the real world represented money that was never ever going to be paid back, was in danger of bringing down the entire financial system?
This crisis was not just foreseeable, it was not just foreseen, it was shouted about from the rooftops since 2004, on blogs like Ben Jones' housing bubble blog, by Calculated Risk, by Mike Shedlock, by Russ Winter, by Barry Ritholtz, by Robert Reich, by Paul Krugman, by Joseph Stiglitz, by James Kunstler, by Stirling Newberry -- in short by just about every housing or economic blogger right, center, and left, from bonddad at Daily Kos to blackhedd on Red State, not to mention myself.
And yet two nights ago, Pelosi, Schumer, Frank, Reid, and everybody else in the Capital sat in "stunned silence" as Bernanke and Paulson spelled out the situation for them. Where were they all these years? Protected from the noise of the Dirty Unwashed Hippies beyond the beltway, by their cocktail party neoliberal free market cone of silence in Washington, that's where.
And so, panic-stricken, they will hurriedly and without reading carefully enact into law what will undoubtedly be the "Economic Patriot Act" of the Bush Administration, with all of the corruption and hidden destruction of rights that conveys, an act that has been estimated at costing up to $1,000,000,000,000 (that's $1 TRILLION) of taxpayer moneys. And still may not succeed.
(a) Authority to Purchase.--The Secretary is authorized to purchase, and to make and fund commitments to purchase, on such terms and conditions as determined by the Secretary, mortgage-related assets from any financial institution having its headquarters in the United States.
(b) Necessary Actions.--The Secretary is authorized to take such actions as the Secretary deems necessary to carry out the authorities in this Act, including, without limitation:
(1) appointing such employees as may be required to carry out the authorities in this Act and defining their duties;
(2) entering into contracts, including contracts for services authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, without regard to any other provision of law regarding public contracts;
(3) designating financial institutions as financial agents of the Government, and they shall perform all such reasonable duties related to this Act as financial agents of the Government as may be required of them;
(4) establishing vehicles that are authorized, subject to supervision by the Secretary, to purchase mortgage-related assets and issue obligations; and
(5) issuing such regulations and other guidance as may be necessary or appropriate to define terms or carry out the authorities of this Act.
Within three months of the first exercise of the authority granted in section 2(a), and semiannually thereafter, the Secretary shall report to the Committees on the Budget, Financial Services, and Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committees on the Budget, Finance, and Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate with respect to the authorities exercised under this Act and the considerations required by section 3.
Sec. 6. Maximum Amount of Authorized Purchases.
The Secretary’s authority to purchase mortgage-related assets under this Act shall be limited to $700,000,000,000 outstanding at any one time
Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act are non-reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court of law or any administrative agency.
“One of you mentioned that you will use about $50 billion dollars a month. If that’s the case, and you’re certainly not going to use all $700 billion immediately, and as you can see there are a lot of questions about whether this will work, we understand you’ve done your best and you think this will work best, but it’s clear we’re in uncharted waters. But what about doing this in tranches? Why couldn’t you ask us for $150 billion, and on January 15th or January 20th we would come back, we would assess how this worked and grant some more money if it’s really working?”
``Accounting rules require banks to value many assets at something close to a very low fire-sale price rather than the hold-to-maturity price,'' Bernanke said in testimony to the Senate Banking Committee today. ``If the Treasury bids for and then buys assets at a price close to the hold-to-maturity price, there will be substantial benefits.''
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke signaled that the government should buy devalued assets at above-market values to make its proposed $700 billion rescue package most effective in combating the financial crisis.
``Accounting rules require banks to value many assets at something close to a very low fire-sale price rather than the hold-to-maturity price,'' Bernanke said in testimony to the Senate Banking Committee today. ``If the Treasury bids for and then buys assets at a price close to the hold-to-maturity price, there will be substantial benefits.''
Bernanke's remarks, an unusual departure from his prepared testimony, come as lawmakers and the Bush administration negotiate a rescue plan aimed at easing the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. The Fed chief said paying prices higher than the bad assets would fetch in the open market would help ``unfreeze'' credit markets and aid the economy.
Analysts said Bernanke is essentially advocating that government use a pricing model that assumes that the debt will be paid in full over a long period of time. That is different from the mark-to-market model used by investment banks that prices assets at what they are worth on a given day.
The risk is that the model does not provide transparent pricing of the assets taxpayers are taking on, said Ann Rutledge, partner at R&R Consulting in New York, a firm that specializes in structured finance. Many of the securities ``are not going to pay at maturity,'' Rutledge said.

The Federal Reserve, which has encouraged excessive borrowing, is to blame for the credit crunch that has gripped world markets for more than a year, Marc Faber, the author of the Gloom Boom & Doom Report, told CNBC on Tuesday.
"About 15 percent of U.S. households have negative equity. Who supplied the leverage into the system? It's called the Federal Reserve Board," Faber said.
"If I'm the drug dealer I'm not responsible that everybody takes drugs, but I facilitate it, especially if I give it out free of charge, I can enlarge the market share, and that's what the Fed has done."
Edward M. Gramlich, a Federal Reserve governor who died in September, warned nearly seven years ago that a fast-growing new breed of lenders was luring many people into risky mortgages they could not afford.
But when Mr. Gramlich privately urged Fed examiners to investigate mortgage lenders affiliated with national banks, he was rebuffed by Alan Greenspan, the Fed chairman.
In 2001, a senior Treasury official, Sheila C. Bair, tried to persuade subprime lenders to adopt a code of "best practices" and to let outside monitors verify their compliance. None of the lenders would agree to the monitors, and many rejected the code itself. Even those who did adopt those practices, Ms. Bair recalled recently, soon let them slip.
And leaders of a housing advocacy group in California, meeting with Mr. Greenspan in 2004, warned that deception was increasing and unscrupulous practices were spreading.
John C. Gamboa and Robert L. Gnaizda of the Greenlining Institute implored Mr. Greenspan to use his bully pulpit and press for a voluntary code of conduct.
"He never gave us a good reason, but he didn't want to do it," Mr. Gnaizda said last week. "He just wasn't interested."
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's $700 billion proposal to stabilize the banking system may push the national debt to the highest level since 1954, threatening an erosion of foreign appetite for U.S. bonds.
The plan, which asks Congress for funds to buy devalued securities from financial institutions, would drive the debt above 70 percent of gross domestic product and the annual budget gap to an all-time high, possibly exceeding $1 trillion next year, economists estimated.
``This is sobering, absolutely sobering, even to someone who doesn't drink,'' said Stan Collender, a former analyst for the House and Senate budget committees, now at Qorvis Communications in Washington.
.....
``The market is very, very negative because of the consequences of raising the debt ceiling and the increase in debt in general,'' Manfred Wolf, head of currency sales in New York for HVB America Inc., a unit of Germany's second-largest bank. ``Foreigners may not be that attracted anymore to U.S. assets.''
Gross U.S. debt, which includes debt held by the public and by government agencies, this year reached about $9.6 trillion, or about 68 percent of gross domestic product.
The Treasury is already borrowing to fund Federal Reserve efforts to inject liquidity into credit markets. Last week it announced sales of $200 billion in short-term debt.
``We've all used the phrase `uncharted waters' so often, yet we keep finding new uncharted waters,'' said Louis Crandall, chief economist of Wrightson ICAP, a research firm Jersey City, New Jersey. ``The fact that the Treasury's borrowing operations are now being affected on such an unprecedented scale adds new uncertainties'' to bond markets.
Bad-Debt Purchases
The Treasury's potential use of all $700 billion to purchase impaired assets would raise the country's debt to more than 70 percent of GDP. The last time American taxpayers owed as much was in 1954, when the nation was still paying down costs incurred during World War II.
``It's an alarming level of debt given that we're not fighting something like World War II,'' said Robert Bixby, executive director of the Concord Coalition, a non-partisan budget watchdog group.
The government reaching the requested debt limit would entail every man, woman and child in the U.S. owing more than $37,000 each. The median U.S. income last year was $50,233.
``We're putting a lot of debt on the books and people are going to be spending a lot of money paying that off for a long time,'' Bixby said.








—Up to $700 billion to buy assets from struggling institutions. The plan is aimed at sopping up residential and commercial mortgages from financial institutions but gives Treasury broad latitude.
—Up to $50 billion from the Great Depression-era Exchange Stabilization Fund to guarantee principal in money market mutual funds to provide the same confidence that consumers have in federally insured bank deposits.
—The Fed committed to make unspecified discount window loans to financial institutions to finance the purchase of assets from money market funds to aid redemptions.
—At least $10 billion in Treasury direct purchases of mortgage-backed securities in September. In doubling the program on Friday, the Treasury said it may purchase even more in the months ahead.
—Up to $144 billion in additional MBS purchases by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.The Treasury announced they would increase purchases up to the newly expanded investment portfolio limits of $850 billion each. On July 30, the Fannie portfolio stood at $758.1 billion with Freddie's at $798.2 billion.
—$85 billion loan for AIG, which would give the Federal government a 79.9 percent stake and avoid a bankruptcy filing for the embattled insurer. AIG management will be dismissed.
—At least $87 billion in repayments to JPMorgan Chase [JPM 47.05 --- UNCH (0) ] for providing financing to underpin trades with units of bankrupt investment bank Lehman Brothers [LEH 0.2151 --- UNCH (0) ]. Paulson said over the weekend he was adamant that public funds not be used to rescue the firm.
—$200 billion for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Treasury will inject up to $100 billion into each institution by purchasing preferred stock to shore up their capital as needed. The deal puts the two housing finance firms under government control.
—$300 billion for the Federal Housing Administration to refinance failing mortgage into new, reduced-principal loans with a federal guarantee, passed as part of a broad housing rescue bill.
—$4 billion in grants to local communities to help them buy and repair homes abandoned due to mortgage foreclosures.
—$29 billion in financing for JPMorgan Chase's government-brokered buyout of Bear Stearns in March. The Fed agreed to take $30 billion in questionable Bear assets as collateral, making JPMorgan liable for the first $1 billion in losses, while agreeing to shoulder any further losses.
—At least $200 billion of currently outstanding loans to banks issued through the Fed's Term Auction Facility, which was recently expanded to allow for longer loans of 84 days alongside the previous 28-day credits.
Valuing these assets will be one of the trickiest questions. For the plan to succeed, financial institutions must be able to get these assets off their books at a high enough price that their balance sheets aren't further pinched.
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson pressed for Congress to act on the bailout plan, calling this a "humbling time" for the U.S.
The government is, in some respects, constrained in driving a hard bargain because the whole point of the program is to help banks get back on solid footing -- not to force them into deep write-downs, potentially exacerbating their pain. At the same time, the market turmoil has complicated efforts to determine the "real" value of the assets.
The mechanics of any sale are expected to be worked out between the asset managers and the Treasury. One option is a reverse auction. In that case, the Treasury could determine a type of asset it wants to buy (say, all AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities) and would then buy securities from financial institutions that offer to sell at the lowest price.
Congressional officials suggested the plan would create a rolling borrowing authority, with the $700 billion limit acting as a cap. That gives the bailout a potential value that's bigger than the entire annual Pentagon budget.
The proposal also calls for raising the public debt limit to $11.3 trillion. It would be the second time this year that ceiling has been lifted.
Treasury wants broad discretion in the program. If market conditions worsen, for instance, it wants flexibility to buy more or different assets.
If the Bush administration has its way, anyone harmed by the Treasury Department's handling of the $700 billion Wall Street bailout might have no remedy.
Draft legislation proposes sweeping powers for Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson to buy and sell mortgage-related securities however he sees fit. Aside from requiring periodic reports to Congress, the bill provides no oversight of the bailout's management -- and specifically bars any court or agency from reviewing it.
Treasury will have authority to issue up to $700 billion of Treasury securities to finance the purchase of troubled assets. The purchases are intended to be residential and commercial mortgage-related assets, which may include mortgage-backed securities and whole loans. The Secretary will have the discretion, in consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, to purchase other assets, as deemed necessary to effectively stabilize financial markets
Reporting. Within three months of the first asset purchases under the program, and semi-annually thereafter, Treasury will provide the appropriate Congressional committees with regular updates on the program.
To qualify for the program, assets must have been originated or issued on or before September 17, 2008. Participating financial institutions must have significant operations in the U.S., unless the Secretary makes a determination, in consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, that broader eligibility is necessary to effectively stabilize financial markets.